Probably my last Breaking Bad based blog post. I want to get back to economics, environment, and theology. :)
I will admit to not having cable. I watched all my BrBa on Netflix. For S5B I bought it on Google and watched it via Chromecast. So for last night, in order to watch it live, I had my dad point his webcam at the TV and we Skyped for 75 minutes. It wasn't ideal, but it did the trick. I'm off to watch the HD version as soon as I post this.
I was positive Walt would rescue Jesse and Jesse would live. I didn't see Walt's belief that Jesse was "partners" with the Nazi's coming though. Maybe that was just a feint to get Jack to habeas corpus (produce the body) to make the rescue easier. Anyways, I love how he faked a fight in order to protect Jesse from his little friend (what a scene!). I also loved how Jesse got to take care of Todd. In a very corporal way as well. No guns. No knives. Just handcuff garrote.
In the end, Jesse rides into the sunset more alive than we've seen him for a long time. I've seen various TV critics and bloggers pondering what becomes of Jesse now. Does he adopt Brock? Does he become a HS chemistry teacher? To me, the answer is obvious.
Jesse goes to prison. Did we forget that Jesse's taped confession that Hank and Gomie oversaw was in the Aryan compound? Jack and the boys laughing over the crybaby? Does anyone doubt the police, DEA, and probably FBI aren't going to find the DVD amidst all the evidence? No magnets can save him this time.
I also think Jesse made the cathartic turn back when he confessed all to Hank and Gomie that he was willing to accept his fate. The confession, however, would surely diminish whatever punishment was coming. The only problem now was he has an additional crime to confess to that isn't present on the DVD -- the murder of Todd.
More important than if Jesse is PHYSICALLY free or not, though, is whether he is mentally and emotionally free. I wouldn't doubt that his howls of freedom were because he was finally done being manipulated by Walter White.
Monday, September 30, 2013
Friday, September 27, 2013
Walter White is NOT a Three Dimensional Character
I've basically been on bed rest for the past 3 weeks. I had never watched Breaking Bad until then. Netflix and Google got me caught up quickly. What a show.
Vince Gilligan is on record several times about how he wanted a show where the main character goes from Mr. Chips to Scarface. I think that's an apt description of Walter's progress. The writing on this show is fabulous. As is the acting. As is the cinematography. Hard to find one weak side.
Saying that WW isn't 3D is not a knock on anything about the show. It's just an observation. Many have tried to pinpoint the exact moment that Walt turns, but I think that moment is impossible to find because from Pilot, Walt is a narcissist. THAT is his fatal flaw and it's present in him from before his 50th birthday. What changed from Pilot to Felina wasn't Walt, it was the situations into which Walt was placed. Yikes -- that passive voice really makes it sound like Walt has no agency. The 7 writers of the show would not approve. But I digress.
In saying that Walt does everything for his family, that is true -- but only to him. His actions are selfish through and through. The old (and lame) saying that there is no selfless act because it makes the one doing it feel good afterwards does not hold true as a generalization, but it DOES hold true for Walt. Every seemingly selfless act Walt does has an ulterior motive underlying it.
For instance, Walt is neither in the meth business or the money business. At the same time, however, he is not in the empire business either. He is in the business of making the best meth anyone has ever seen. When he tries to leave the business, his motivation for re-entering is never about money OR meth -- but about the pride he gains from cooking.
Any time he finds himself in a bind, he is able to project the blame onto another character (often Jesse -- that poor sonofagun). When Walt breaks the norms of proper behavior, he feels entitled to do it. Those norms, after all, are for everyone else. He is different though.
These are all classic symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder. I believe THAT diagnosis even has primacy over his sociopathy. He is first and foremost a narcissist. And that started at the beginning and continues to the . . . well at least through the penultimate episode. We shall see.
BREAKING EDIT: The above was confirmed in the series finale "Felina." "I did it for me. I liked it. I was good at it. I was alive."
Vince Gilligan is on record several times about how he wanted a show where the main character goes from Mr. Chips to Scarface. I think that's an apt description of Walter's progress. The writing on this show is fabulous. As is the acting. As is the cinematography. Hard to find one weak side.
Saying that WW isn't 3D is not a knock on anything about the show. It's just an observation. Many have tried to pinpoint the exact moment that Walt turns, but I think that moment is impossible to find because from Pilot, Walt is a narcissist. THAT is his fatal flaw and it's present in him from before his 50th birthday. What changed from Pilot to Felina wasn't Walt, it was the situations into which Walt was placed. Yikes -- that passive voice really makes it sound like Walt has no agency. The 7 writers of the show would not approve. But I digress.
In saying that Walt does everything for his family, that is true -- but only to him. His actions are selfish through and through. The old (and lame) saying that there is no selfless act because it makes the one doing it feel good afterwards does not hold true as a generalization, but it DOES hold true for Walt. Every seemingly selfless act Walt does has an ulterior motive underlying it.
For instance, Walt is neither in the meth business or the money business. At the same time, however, he is not in the empire business either. He is in the business of making the best meth anyone has ever seen. When he tries to leave the business, his motivation for re-entering is never about money OR meth -- but about the pride he gains from cooking.
Any time he finds himself in a bind, he is able to project the blame onto another character (often Jesse -- that poor sonofagun). When Walt breaks the norms of proper behavior, he feels entitled to do it. Those norms, after all, are for everyone else. He is different though.
These are all classic symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder. I believe THAT diagnosis even has primacy over his sociopathy. He is first and foremost a narcissist. And that started at the beginning and continues to the . . . well at least through the penultimate episode. We shall see.
BREAKING EDIT: The above was confirmed in the series finale "Felina." "I did it for me. I liked it. I was good at it. I was alive."
Sunday, September 22, 2013
Breaking Bad, Turn-of-the-century American Literature, and Catharsis
The Scene
A woman stands at the water's edge. She's married with children. At one point, marriage and motherhood provided her with joy. She now has lost whatever passion she had for life. She attempted to find that thrill of life via an affair. It didn't work. Now she doesn't feel anything. She's numb. She attempts to regain some sense of feeling by dipping a toe into the cold water. Nothing. She continues deeper and deeper into the water searching for SOME feeling. Nothing. It's not that she wants to die. She simply wishes to cease living. Eventually she's fully submerged.
Is the woman Skyler White or is it Edna Pontellier?
Edna who?
I am admittedly a Breaking Bad neophyte, but what I love about the show is the wealth of literary sources it draws on. The scene above, from the episode Fifty-One, could just as easily have been from Kate Chopin's The Awakening. From what I can tell, no one has made this connection yet. There are probably several allusions per episode. It's part of what makes the show great. In an age of so much reality television (that isn't really reality) BS, it's nice to watch a show that is intelligent and thought provoking.
Catharsis vs. Kenosis
Vince Gilligan is obviously well versed in the theory of writing. He regularly draws on techniques used from Greek tragedy, to Shakespeare, to postmodern story-telling. Catharsis is central to all of these. A cathartic experience for the audience is similar to fasting or a detox program -- it empties oneself of unneeded accretions of daily life in order to rearrange the things that truly matter. In this sense, it is similar to the concept of repentance (metanoia). We stop, look around, and reassess our priorities. Good TV can help with this.
Kenosis, on the other hand, is an emptying of oneself. While this can make room for other things (such as in the archetypical kenotic experience of Christ emptying himself in order to perform solely the will of the Father), in contemporary culture we empty ourselves and that's the end of it. No refilling. No finding other priorities. No reassessment. There is plenty of programming on television that serves a kenotic function. We "escape" into the world of the Kardashians, emptying our minds while we persist vegetatively in an unreal reality show.
Someone may watch the Karsashians and decide to look more into fashion. Great. That's just what this world needs. Someone watching Breaking Bad may decide to delve more into chemistry (hopefully not with the intent of cooking meth, but rather of understanding the dialog -- the "chirality" and "exothermic" stuff). Or read the wiki on Shakespeare to understand just why so many people compare Walt to Macbeth.
Vince Gilligan is obviously a creative guy. But what he has created in Breaking Bad is also creative. The show is itself a creator.
A woman stands at the water's edge. She's married with children. At one point, marriage and motherhood provided her with joy. She now has lost whatever passion she had for life. She attempted to find that thrill of life via an affair. It didn't work. Now she doesn't feel anything. She's numb. She attempts to regain some sense of feeling by dipping a toe into the cold water. Nothing. She continues deeper and deeper into the water searching for SOME feeling. Nothing. It's not that she wants to die. She simply wishes to cease living. Eventually she's fully submerged.
Is the woman Skyler White or is it Edna Pontellier?
Edna who?
I am admittedly a Breaking Bad neophyte, but what I love about the show is the wealth of literary sources it draws on. The scene above, from the episode Fifty-One, could just as easily have been from Kate Chopin's The Awakening. From what I can tell, no one has made this connection yet. There are probably several allusions per episode. It's part of what makes the show great. In an age of so much reality television (that isn't really reality) BS, it's nice to watch a show that is intelligent and thought provoking.
Catharsis vs. Kenosis
Vince Gilligan is obviously well versed in the theory of writing. He regularly draws on techniques used from Greek tragedy, to Shakespeare, to postmodern story-telling. Catharsis is central to all of these. A cathartic experience for the audience is similar to fasting or a detox program -- it empties oneself of unneeded accretions of daily life in order to rearrange the things that truly matter. In this sense, it is similar to the concept of repentance (metanoia). We stop, look around, and reassess our priorities. Good TV can help with this.
Kenosis, on the other hand, is an emptying of oneself. While this can make room for other things (such as in the archetypical kenotic experience of Christ emptying himself in order to perform solely the will of the Father), in contemporary culture we empty ourselves and that's the end of it. No refilling. No finding other priorities. No reassessment. There is plenty of programming on television that serves a kenotic function. We "escape" into the world of the Kardashians, emptying our minds while we persist vegetatively in an unreal reality show.
Someone may watch the Karsashians and decide to look more into fashion. Great. That's just what this world needs. Someone watching Breaking Bad may decide to delve more into chemistry (hopefully not with the intent of cooking meth, but rather of understanding the dialog -- the "chirality" and "exothermic" stuff). Or read the wiki on Shakespeare to understand just why so many people compare Walt to Macbeth.
Vince Gilligan is obviously a creative guy. But what he has created in Breaking Bad is also creative. The show is itself a creator.
Sunday, September 15, 2013
Against Neil deGrasse Tyson
Someone has decided that Neil deGrasse Tyson is all the sudden in vogue. Fine. Better than the Kardashians. But what gets me is that he has been anointed the spokesperson for "Science" with a capital S. Half of my problem is that some of what he says does not stand up to Science itself. The other half is his attack on faith.
Before I go further, it is very important to point out that I am not anti-atheist. I don't do any proselytizing of my own. On some "god" concepts, I agree more with atheists than with people of faith. For me, it isn't as important the end you get to but rather how you get there. Blind faith belief in God isn't my thing. But neither is blind faith belief in science. So while I will criticize NDT for some of his thoughts on religion, please don't confuse me with the type of Christian that is militant to his views because of evolution or the big bang.
The easiest way to illustrate my point is by using his quotes. Granted, quotes are taken out of context, but they're also more concise. Let's start with places I agree with him.
For sure. This is central to Sallie McFague's theology. As he says eloquently, we are made of stardust.
Now for where I have serious problems with him. Granted, when you're asked to speak as much as he is, some of what you say may not be too well thought out. But this next one shows how his philosophy of science is seriously lacking.
Wow. Has he never read Thomas Kuhn? Science changes its facts all the time! We believe something as a rock solid fact until something else comes along to replace it. There's nothing wrong with that. That's how it's supposed to work, but he is blind to this fluid nature of scientific knowledge. It is almost like he clings to science the way the Middle Ages clung to religion. It's true because God/Pope/Bible/Science says so no matter what proves it wrong! Well . . . science has been proven wrong. Ergo it is no more infallible than the trio mentioned above. NDT's view of science is religious.
Which makes his attack on religion a bit bizarre. But first, some of it is just funny.
Ha. Humans are always looking for an out and force majeur is a good one! While this one is funny, it points to a concept that comes up in some of his other quotes. God was only invented as a means to explain the unexplainable. As we explain more stuff, we need less God. That works, but only if you agree with the original presumption. I don't think too many people nowadays believe in God as a means of explaining the unexplainable. We abandoned that God long ago (for good reason). So if NGT is arguing for the Death of God movement, I'm all for it. Our idea of what God is should certainly NOT rest on explaining unexplainable phenomena.
It is this nuance that he seems to always ignore. For instance, he goes on to connect the two (unknown/God) erroneously. He says, to paraphrase, there is no God because I have a wrong definition of God.
Again, if making God out to be the prime mover, then science has done a lot to shoot that theory down. But who says that has to be what people of faith view God as? Perhaps God is something other than the benevolent force that moves the universe?
He goes further to imply that people of faith are not only wrong on a scientific basis, but less intelligent than atheists.
Now there are several fallacies loaded into this quote. First, why should we view the NAS as the experts on whether God exists or not? The end of science is not to prove or disprove the existence of God, so why should he expect 100% of its members to be atheists? Second, why should all scientists be atheists? Is there empirical evidence to disprove the existence of God? Absence of evidence of God's existence does not equal evidence of God's absence. This is a central tenet of science (since Popper) with which I would imagine NGT is familiar. So why ignore it now? Third, if I attended a different conference, say the American Academy of Religion, would it be surprising to find that 85% of its members believed in God? Or that 15% didn't? I wouldn't think so. Studying religion does not require one to believe in God. Studying science should not require someone NOT to believe in God. To assert otherwise sounds like demagoguery.
If we boil science down to a set of beliefs based on the scientific method and empirical data, why should religion not fit the bill? Why should empirical data not include faith? I'll be honest -- I've seen a ghost. That's empirical data. Two other people saw it as well. I'm sure a skeptic could disprove it and I'm not interested in defending my experience. The point is that it was experienced (the definition of empirical). Faith can be experienced as well. With all our senses. Not only seen and felt and tasted, but also intuited in ways that go beyond our traditional five senses. For NGT to argue otherwise does a disservice to his truly awesome scientific contributions.
Before I go further, it is very important to point out that I am not anti-atheist. I don't do any proselytizing of my own. On some "god" concepts, I agree more with atheists than with people of faith. For me, it isn't as important the end you get to but rather how you get there. Blind faith belief in God isn't my thing. But neither is blind faith belief in science. So while I will criticize NDT for some of his thoughts on religion, please don't confuse me with the type of Christian that is militant to his views because of evolution or the big bang.
The easiest way to illustrate my point is by using his quotes. Granted, quotes are taken out of context, but they're also more concise. Let's start with places I agree with him.
Heck yea. We shouldn't allow teachers to teach stuff that isn't true. Period. Can't argue there.People cited violation of the First Amendment when a New Jersey schoolteacher asserted that evolution and the Big Bang are not scientific and that Noah's ark carried dinosaurs. This case is not about the need to separate church and state; it's about the need to separate ignorant, scientifically illiterate people from the ranks of teachers.
I know that the molecules in my body are traceable to phenomena in the cosmos.
For sure. This is central to Sallie McFague's theology. As he says eloquently, we are made of stardust.
Now for where I have serious problems with him. Granted, when you're asked to speak as much as he is, some of what you say may not be too well thought out. But this next one shows how his philosophy of science is seriously lacking.
The good thing about science is that it's true whether or not you believe in it.
Wow. Has he never read Thomas Kuhn? Science changes its facts all the time! We believe something as a rock solid fact until something else comes along to replace it. There's nothing wrong with that. That's how it's supposed to work, but he is blind to this fluid nature of scientific knowledge. It is almost like he clings to science the way the Middle Ages clung to religion. It's true because God/Pope/Bible/Science says so no matter what proves it wrong! Well . . . science has been proven wrong. Ergo it is no more infallible than the trio mentioned above. NDT's view of science is religious.
Which makes his attack on religion a bit bizarre. But first, some of it is just funny.
Once upon a time, people identified the god Neptune as the source of storms at sea. Today we call these storms hurricanes.... The only people who still call hurricanes acts of God are the people who write insurance forms.
Ha. Humans are always looking for an out and force majeur is a good one! While this one is funny, it points to a concept that comes up in some of his other quotes. God was only invented as a means to explain the unexplainable. As we explain more stuff, we need less God. That works, but only if you agree with the original presumption. I don't think too many people nowadays believe in God as a means of explaining the unexplainable. We abandoned that God long ago (for good reason). So if NGT is arguing for the Death of God movement, I'm all for it. Our idea of what God is should certainly NOT rest on explaining unexplainable phenomena.
It is this nuance that he seems to always ignore. For instance, he goes on to connect the two (unknown/God) erroneously. He says, to paraphrase, there is no God because I have a wrong definition of God.
The more I learn about the universe, the less convinced I am that there's any sort of benevolent force that has anything to do with it, at all.
Again, if making God out to be the prime mover, then science has done a lot to shoot that theory down. But who says that has to be what people of faith view God as? Perhaps God is something other than the benevolent force that moves the universe?
He goes further to imply that people of faith are not only wrong on a scientific basis, but less intelligent than atheists.
I want to put on the table, not why 85% of the members of the National Academy of Sciences reject God, I want to know why 15% of the National Academy don’t.
Now there are several fallacies loaded into this quote. First, why should we view the NAS as the experts on whether God exists or not? The end of science is not to prove or disprove the existence of God, so why should he expect 100% of its members to be atheists? Second, why should all scientists be atheists? Is there empirical evidence to disprove the existence of God? Absence of evidence of God's existence does not equal evidence of God's absence. This is a central tenet of science (since Popper) with which I would imagine NGT is familiar. So why ignore it now? Third, if I attended a different conference, say the American Academy of Religion, would it be surprising to find that 85% of its members believed in God? Or that 15% didn't? I wouldn't think so. Studying religion does not require one to believe in God. Studying science should not require someone NOT to believe in God. To assert otherwise sounds like demagoguery.
If we boil science down to a set of beliefs based on the scientific method and empirical data, why should religion not fit the bill? Why should empirical data not include faith? I'll be honest -- I've seen a ghost. That's empirical data. Two other people saw it as well. I'm sure a skeptic could disprove it and I'm not interested in defending my experience. The point is that it was experienced (the definition of empirical). Faith can be experienced as well. With all our senses. Not only seen and felt and tasted, but also intuited in ways that go beyond our traditional five senses. For NGT to argue otherwise does a disservice to his truly awesome scientific contributions.
Wednesday, September 11, 2013
The Evolving Just War Tradition (Part 3): Three Public Keys to Just War
A well trained military. A free and high quality press. Civil discourse.
Part one with bibliography can be found here.
Part one with bibliography can be found here.
The Need for Military Training
Military
training is multifaceted. There are technical aspects that need to be
mastered such as accurately delivering munitions to a target or
flying a plane. Another side of military training is the ethics of
combat. This includes rules of engagement briefings on the lowest
level and philosophical debates on the highest level.1
For the Just War tradition, technical training is most important with
regards to noncombatant immunity. When training is denied or
under-emphasized, Walzer feels that “the inevitable consequence of
putting deadly weapons into the hands of undisciplined soldiers, and
armed men into the hands of stupid or fanatical generals” is
civilian death (130).
At
the heart of this issue are two separate concepts of accuracy, which
Himes labels “indiscriminate weapons and the indiscriminate use of
discriminate weapons” (152). On the one hand, soldiers are expected
to deliver their discriminate munitions accurately. On the other,
military brass are held accountable for not using indiscriminate
munitions in situations where noncombatant immunity can be impaired.
Indiscriminate munitions (cluster bombs, land mines, etc.) are
inherently unjust when used in situations where combatants and
noncombatants share close quarters. For reasons of aim, a well
trained standing military can in many ways be considered necessary
for a just war. A polar opposite of this would be the child soldier
who is handed an AK-47 with no more training than a viewing of a
“Rambo” movie (McCormick 121). When it comes to technical
training and the discriminate use of indiscriminate munitions, the
United States' operations in Iraq have received relatively little
criticism. The instances of civilian deaths by American fire have
usually proven to be accurately delivered discriminate munitions. At
fault was the target selection process, the only obvious remedy for
which is better military intelligence.
Concerning
the ethical training of a military, Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee, and
Don Carrick have edited a collection of essays entitled Ethics
Education in the Military. These
essays shed light on both the importance of ethics training in the
military as well as the patchwork nature of teaching the subject in
the United States.2
Among the important questions raised in these essays are “why is
ethics training in the military important?” and “what type of
ethics should be taught?”
One answer
to the “why” question is the functional approach that believes an
ethical soldier is a “better” soldier where “better” meaning
“a more efficient killer.” A second argument for ethics training
is aspirational – soldiers are expected to leave the ethics
training as “better” people who will thus make better ethical
decisions (Robinson 161). As for the “what type” question, the
answer in the United States is almost exclusively virtue ethics. This
method aims to inculcate several virtues into the soldier such as
loyalty, respect, honor, and courage. At both West Point and the
United States Air Force Academy, virtue ethics is the predominant
form of ethics training.
I believe
the argument for virtue ethics training is less than ideal. As West
points, “West Point and other service academy graduates commit war
crimes and other offences at rates similar to less well 'bred'
soldiers” (Robinson 39). If this is true, it is all the proof
needed to put the nail in virtue ethics's coffin. The presumption
that a soldier who embodies the virtues listed above will
automatically be able to make ethical decisions on the battlefield,
often with very little time to contemplate, is fallacious. Walzer
spends over 300 pages attempting to lay out the complexities of the
Just War tradition and provides specific historical case studies
showing how these theories need real life revisions when on the
battlefield. This sort of casuist case study is, in my opinion, what
is most needed in military ethics training. Luckily, it is not
completely lacking. West mentions how cadets are exposed to case
studies throughout their four years at West Point. This facet of
their training, however, must be nominal as he only devotes one
sentence to it. In his essay on ethics training at the U.S. Air Force
Academy, Martin Cook states that supplemental training includes
day-long retreats which include “small group discussions in which
experienced officers and civilians discuss with cadets their own
real-world moral conflicts and hard cases they have encountered in
their professional lives” (Robinson 60). Cook goes on to say that
the cadets consistently rate this supplemental training as the most
valuable and enjoyable (Robinson 60). This leads one to wonder why
this small group case study format is “supplemental” and not
“core.”
An
additional oversight in the ethical training of the United States
military lies in the focus on officer training at the expense of
non-commissioned officer and enlisted training. When comparing ethics
training across countries, Jessica Wolfendale points out that “the
ethics programmes offered to non-commissioned officers . . . and
enlisted personnel, when they do occur, are usually of short duration
or non-existent” (Robinson 167). This is a problem considering the
sorts of moral dilemmas in which so many NCOs and enlisted soldiers
find themselves. In his foreword to this collection, Patrick
Cordingly noted that in the first Iraq war, the chain of command
became so stretched that “[s]oldiers, unsupervised by default,
performed tasks that they were not prepared for” (Robinson xiii).
One
would think that this lack of supervision may have been the principal
cause for atrocities like the Abu Ghraib scandal, but I believe
differently. The acts committed at Abu Ghraib were so despicable that
one need not have a training in military ethics to know that they
were grossly immoral. I believe there was another principal cause and
that it is related to the inculcation of virtue ethics. Many of the
virtues that the United States military embraces serve to create a
strong sense of camaraderie. This is especially true in institutions
such as West Point and the USAFA, but can also be found within units
that remain together for extended amounts of time – especially when
combat is involved. The desired result of this virtuous camaraderie
is a esprit de corps on
the battlefield which not only makes the soldier more efficient, but
also contributes to the “leave no man behind” spirit. A corollary
to this camaraderie, however, is the “no snitching” spirit found
at Abu Ghraib. Those who knew that what was occurring was wrong
failed to speak out immediately or were coerced into remaining
silent. Camaraderie is a two-edged sword to which continuously close
attention must be paid.
The Need for a High Quality
Press
While
the need for a high quality press is important for many topics of
national interest, this idea plays an important role specifically in
the justification of violence. Several thinkers have pointed to the
importance of the press in establishing a justifiable use of force.
Yoder believes that “[t]he person claiming to respect just-war
rationality must [study the facts of politics] . . . and therefore
must have a reliable independent source of information” (78).
Yoder's observation on the importance of the press is accurate. While
some critics oversimplify the Just War tradition to a “calculus”
which spits out a decision based on the evidence entered, the
importance of accurate data is not denied by any of its adherents.
In complex
issues such as the justification of war, the press plays a three-fold
role: (1) it provides the data mentioned above, (2) it provides
analysis of this data, (3) and it provides one of the forums used in
the public conversation I will address below. Concerning the first
role, the data the press shared concerning WMD in Iraq and the
linking of Hussein to terrorist organizations proved the most
damaging. One must wonder how these two assertions were able to “pass
muster” in a critical press that supposedly relies on multiple
sourcing. While Piers Robinson, et al, focus on the media in the
United Kingdom, they offer some salient points concerning the U.S.
media as well. For instance, they point out that journalists tend to
favor the “spin” of the political elite and therefore tend “to
be supportive of political elites . . . through the dependence of
journalists upon elite political sources” (Robinson 537). The fact
that these sources often remain anonymous further allows government
officials to “feed the news” their own version of stories – in
effect, their own data. These authors go on to point out that one
would expect the press to also rely on “other involved parties
including civilians, humanitarian organizations, antiwar movements,
and international actors such as the U.N.” but that “the relative
absence of such alternative perspectives is important in rendering
media 'vulnerable to manipulation' by officials” (Robinson 540).
Citing a
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting study, Andrew Calabrese provides
empirical evidence that what Robinson asserted is also present in the
U.S. media. This study, which examined the principal news shows of
ABC, CBS, NBC, FNC, PBS, and CNN, found that 63% of on-air sources
were current or former government employees (Calabrese 166).
Calabrese also points to the government's use of foreign media to
knowingly disseminate inaccurate information. While they considered
this part of a “psy ops” campaign, there arose fear that “the
U.S. media would pick up disinformation from the foreign media and
publish and broadcast it to U.S. audiences” (Calabrese 163). This
shows that the government was aware of the press' penchant for
running stories without properly sourcing them and viewed the risk of
poisoning the well of U.S. news to be too great. These authors place
a great deal of importance on the inclusion of non-governmental
sources and multiple sources for an accurate press.
Concerning
the second role of the press, that of data analysis, several studies
have examined the manner in which the press has “framed” the war.
Ian Taylor uses frame analysis to examine the different ways in which
the data mentioned above is mediated through news sources. Taylor
identifies three frames each for pro-war and anti-war opinion and
notes that these frames are important “because as the main
protagonists in the debate they were the ones who drove the arguments
onwards vigorously promoting their packages as they attempted to
persuade public opinion” (85). With this in mind, one has to wonder
whether any of these three anti-war frames were present in American
media. As noted above, the main news sources in the U.S. were, if not
pro-war, decidedly not
anti-war. Taylor goes on to stress the importance of a polyvocal
press because “one of the main tests of pluralism for the
mainstream national media must be whether or not the full range of
perspectives on the conflict were articulated through the national
press when taken as a whole” (86). If one function of the press is
to help “persuade public opinion,” then this power must be held
accountable when that opinion approaches monolithic status.
In
his critical essay on both the media and the Bush administration,
Calabrese early on points out how “the major media of the United
States played a key role in uncritically projecting American
imperialism, both domestically and abroad” (155). While Calabrese's
passion at times proves overly subjective, he provides an important
argument against the commercialization of American news media. The
fact that many news outlets are now owned by large corporations
combined with the profits generated by high ratings, “the networks
went to great lengths to seamlessly blend their patriotism,
technological prowess, and professionalism, which in the long run has
the potential to yield market advantages” (Calabrese 168). Cristian
Parker Gumucio notes the same danger for newspapers: “[t]he
ownership of the written press by audio-visual corporations
encourages unthinking consumption and prevents critical analysis”
(27). The chance for increased revenue through war-time ratings as
well as the risk of losing ratings by portraying anti-war opinion
surely entered into the framing debate for national news outlets. The
risk involved in questioning the justification for war, especially
after war has already begun, is great for those in the media. In his
review of combat films, Patrick McCormick notes that “[e]arly
massive demonstrations against the war were met by rallies and
ribbons directing Americans to 'support the troops'” and that
“honor demands that Americans 'support the troops' by continuing to
wage war” (110). This equation of “anti-war” with “anti-troops”
allowed the pro-war faction to dictate the conversation and
implicitly threaten news outlets. As Calabrese states, “[c]ommercial
advertisers generally do not wish to be associated with a program
that presents, much less advocates, a minority political viewpoint”
and because of this “the mainstream U.S. media neglected to give
American citizens an adequate picture of the scale of the antiwar
movement at home or abroad” (171).
The issue of a quality press has two substantial deficits to
overcome: one being the reliance upon single anonymous sources for
stories and the other being the extent to which profit-making
dictates the conversation for national news outlets. These two are
undoubtedly related. The risk of “getting scooped” makes the time
needed to corroborate stories with multiple sources less of a
priority. Yet on issues as important as WMD, terrorist links to Iraq,
and war itself, it is the responsibility of the press to perform its
due diligence in reporting data as well as in analyzing and framing
that data responsibly.
The Need for Quality Public
Conversation
An aspect of American democracy that has shown itself to be
deficient not only in the debate leading up to the Iraq War, but in
multiple matters is the lack of quality public conversation. While
this has been apparent in subjects as diverse as presidential
elections, Wall Street bailouts, and health insurance reform, it was
specifically a problem in the debate on the justification of an
invasion of Iraq. While “discourse” and “dialog” do not
etymologically denote an either/or limitation, it is exactly this
dimorphic character that I believe is at fault for American's
inability to enter into quality conversation.
This binary nature of conversation is present even in authors who
were in the minority anti-war camp. George Weigel ends his essay with
“[w]e may be sure that the war against terror will suffer
commensurately if the Iraqi phase of the quest for freedom and a new
politics in the Arab Islamic world is frustrated. No one – in the
Congress, in the churches, in the academy, or on the street – can
wish for that and still claim the mantle of moral seriousness”
(20). This bifurcation, either you are for the continued Iraqi phase
of the War on Terror or you lack moral seriousness, is a fallacy of
false dilemma. There are other options than just these two and part
of a quality conversation is to recognize them. Whether it is due to
a two-party system or simply the dualistic nature of mankind, the
conversation on Iraq quickly became one in which all comers were fit
into the “hawk” or “dove” camp or similarly binary
pigeonholes. As Yoder points out, there is an effective, if
disingenuous, rhetorical device used where “politicians may exploit
nationalistic and xenophobic, even racist, enthusiasms of common
folk, thereby putting themselves under pressure to perform in a way
as 'patriotic' as their campaign language” (26). This sort of
rhetoric further strengthens the binary characteristic of national
conversation.
One question, therefore, is “how can the church help in creating
and supporting quality conversation on a national level?”3
Luckily, there has already been work done by theologians and
ethicists on this question as it relates to other debates and much of
this can be equally applicable to the Iraq War. One of these is the
pastoral realization that the church has the responsibility to be a
voice for its sheep. As Shaun Casey states in his critique of the
Iraq War, “[t]he American people, whose sons and daughters will be
put in harm's way, deserve better [than the case made for war by the
Bush administration] from their public leaders” (94). I would add
that those same sons and daughters are not only owed justification
for going to war, but also a voice in the conversation.
The need for national conversation is most important for our “sons
and daughters” and their families that will end up making the
ultimate sacrifice. It is in this vein that Walzer shows his adept
casuistry:
The stakes are high when we debate whether to send soldiers into
battle, especially when we send them to intervene in someone else's
country. Leaders and ordinary citizens need to worry about, argue
about, even fight (nonviolently) about what to do. And when they
worry, argue, and fight, they will cite examples just as I have done
in this book and they will use the terms of just war theory – more
justly than tyrants do, because they will respect the disagreements
of their fellow citizens. (xvi)
Walzer may be idealistic in assuming the mutual respect of
disagreeing opinions, but his accent on the importance of
conversation is significant. He later goes on to stress the important
role that this national conversation has in making the case for war.
While American troops are, as of now, unable to practice selective
conscientious objection, they still have the right to exercise their
displeasure of selective wars in other ways – some of these include
voicing their opinions in the national conversation.
Since this country is founded on the “consent of the governed,”
it is also likewise necessary that troops should (nominally) approve
of any military conflict. Walzer thinks “[t]he need to seek [the
troops'] consent (whatever the form in which it was sought and given
or not given) would surely limit the occasions of war . . .” (29).
Yoder follows this same line of thinking when referring to the
“morally responsible citizen draftee” (47). He believes that this
concept finally came to the fore during the Vietnam war when
“[t]housands of young men refused to serve for reasons derived not
from absolutist pacifism but from their own conscientious, although
not always articulate, application of the just-war criteria” (Yoder
48). These troops revoked their consent and were willing to pay the
price for it.
This also raises questions of legitimate authority in the United
States. If the “consent of the governed” and “government by the
people” are assumed, then any decision to go to war without some
“broad consensus” could realistically be considered illegitimate.
Add to this the 20th century concept of going to war
without a congressional declaration of war and the case could truly
be made that the U.S. practices unilateral war declaration through
the power of the Oval Office. Returning a war declaration to its
proper place in Congress would necessitate a conversation and hold
Congresspeople accountable for their votes, thus raising the need for
national conversation and “broad consensus.”
While this country is also built on the idea that “all men are
created equal,” this concept can be dangerous when transposed to
the realm of opinion. This can result in an “egalitarianism of
opinion” where experts have no added weight in the conversation. In
responding to this concept, Walzer points out that “morality is
unimportant if all opinions are equal, because then no particular
opinion has any force . . .. No one can argue about justice and war .
. . without striving for an authoritative voice and laying claim to a
certain 'weightiness'” (288). In effect what Walzer is calling for
here is a better national education program in Just War tradition.
While Walzer's work is strictly secular, an obvious choice for
enactment of this program is the church. The pulpit may not be the
place for a sermon on Just War theory, but there are undoubtedly
other opportunities for education within the church.
While the church should not only provide education and a forum for
conversation, it should also maintain its own prophetic voice and
speak out in opposition to the official government position when
needed. A group of Catholic bishops as well as a group of one hundred
Christian ethicists responded thusly when talk of an Iraq invasion
first came up (Colson 72). The statement of the Bishops stressed the
importance that “decisions concerning possible war in Iraq require
. . . broad consensus within our nation” (Burghardt 18). Himes
follows this prophetic clerical voice to an even broader conclusion
when he states that “[w]hat is needed today is not a pastoral
letter but the searching public discussion of the early eighties that
was partly stimulated by the process of writing the 1983
letter [The Challenge of Peace]” (157). The prophetic voice
of the church should be a catalyst towards a broader conversation in
individual churches, between laity, in the academy, and in the press.
As Patrick McCormick notes, the church has often lost this prophetic
voice and adopted a voice of acquiescence instead: “American
citizens (who are overwhelmingly Christian) have consistently
surrendered their duty to critically examine their government's call
for war . . ., preferring instead to allow the president and Pentagon
to make such judgments and seeing themselves as obliged merely to
support the war” (118). Even Reinhold Niebuhr, famous for
renouncing his pacifism in exchange for a justified defense of
Europe against Nazism, believes that there should be a conversation
not over going to war, but over weapons systems. When referring to
the hydrogen bomb he said “[t]he fact that this [the development of
the hydrogen bomb] was done without public debate represents a real
threat to the democratic substance of our life” (235). One could
assume he would feel the same whether referring to the H-bomb or the
Iraq War.
On the subject of theoretical moral discernment in the church, David
Fredrickson offers helpful advice in his analysis of Pauline ethics.
Fredrickson uses three of Paul's epistles to lay out a framework for
discernment within the early church. For Paul, “free speech” was
an essential aspect of discernment. This translation is nowadays
layered with many different images (civil liberties, first amendment,
Founding Fathers), but Fredrickson points out none of these were
Paul's meaning. For Paul, “free speech” meant being able to speak
freely in a social setting without fear of recrimination or judgment.
Free speech is necessary for “politics” and “democracy” to
function properly (Fredrickson uses these words in an Ancient Greek
sense). For Paul, the early congregations he founded were analogous
to the Greek city-states. Every wealthy male should have a voice in
the city-state. Paul, however, took this a step farther, including
not just wealthy men. Fredrickson lists this as another key function
of free speech — the silent voices on the periphery must be given a
chance to be heard.
Free speech is the first essential ingredient for Fredrickson's
image of moral discernment. The second is a church-wide conversation.
Allowing all voices to be heard in the setting of a church-wide
conversation can be a powerful tool towards maintaining unity in the
church even amidst disagreement. This church-wide conversation can be
carried over in the national sphere where Paul's concept of “free
speech” could be honored and nurtured (as there is nothing overtly
religious about mutual respect in conversation). This practice could
easily negate the current level of binary dialog where each
individual is allowed to belong to one of two groups. Fredrickson's
advice would transform this into a plethora of voices in America's
pluralistic conversation where the “silent voices on the periphery”
are also included.
Conclusion
Examining
the Just War tradition and its relation to the Iraq War brings some
important, if disconcerting, truths to light. Just war criteria, no
matter how strictly enforced, are useless in the face of inaccurate
data. While these criteria are not simply a computational model that
spits out a solution, basing deliberation on inaccuracies will
usually not yield an accurate result. Attempting to have a national
conversation on the justification for the Iraq war when rhetoric
makes it difficult for citizens to subscribe to a position other than
“for the troops” or “against the troops” is difficult. At the
same time, the opinions of these very troops are hard to hear over
the din of the million dollar industry of the press. While there is
no easy fix for these issues, I have attempted to highlight some of
the greatest of the problems as they relate to Just War tradition in
the 21st
century. From these problems come some possible solutions, or steps
toward solutions, that can be enacted – some in the secular sphere
and some in the religious sphere.
First, ethics education in the military should not be limited to are
accented towards officers. Considering the extent to which
non-commissioned officers and enlisted are expected to make difficult
moral decisions in the heat of combat, ethics education is necessary
across the board. The program for this education, while possibly
maintaining its emphasis on virtue ethics, must at the least provide
a solid curriculum in case-study based ethical deliberation similar
to Walzer's approach.
The press could also help the situation by turning away from single
anonymously sourced reports and returning to multiple-sourced
corroboration. At the heart of this may well be the profit-driven
nature of the press in contemporary society, yet the fear of getting
scooped is no excuse for poor journalism. How this profit-driven
model of journalism can be used towards providing the public with a
better product (as opposed to a more entertaining one) is important
on every issue, not just war, and deserves more attention.
From an ecclesiological perspective, the church must remember its
responsibility to speak boldly when need be and reclaim its prophetic
voice as shown by Amos. This is true especially with regards to the
White House and news sources. The church should also embrace its
ability to serve as a nurturing environment for “free speech”
with a goal of moral discernment. These two suggestions, combined
with a catechesis of Just War tradition in the church, would go a
long way towards eliminating the fallacies of false dilemma rampant
in national conversation.
Lastly, war should not be a unilateral issue. The ability of the
president to initiate a seven year (or longer) war without appealing
to Congress for a war declaration is not only appalling, but
unconstitutional. While the president can rightly use the military
for a police action, returning the responsibility of going to war to
the Congress would force a national conversation and make those
voting accountable to their constituents.
The goal of the Just War tradition should be to make each subsequent
war more just than the last. Interestingly, to do this requires
well-trained standing armies. Standing armies are anathema to a
lasting global peace. As Walzer puts it, “[o]ne does not abolish
war by fighting it well; nor does fighting it well make it tolerable”
(45). Yet until the time comes that “the wolf shall live with the
lamb,” this tradition serves to reduce the amount of suffering
resulting from war by restricting both when it is fought and how it
is fought.
1This
does not imply that these are the only two types of military
training.
2The
editors included essays concerning the militaries of many different
countries, although the two on the U.S. are most salient for this
discussion.
3Here
I use “church” to broadly refer to the Christian church in
America. It could easily apply to a specific denomination,
organization, or individual congregation as well.
Sunday, September 8, 2013
The Evolving Just War Tradition (Part 2): Just War and Iraq
Part 1 (with bibliography) can be found here.
The Just War Tradition After
9/11
The
above serves as an overview of Just War criteria, but with the advent
of the War on Terror there arose a need to focus on and revise some
of the ten criteria that Reimer lays out. For instance, how can we
prosecute a war against anonymous terrorists while maintaining
discrimination between combatants and noncombatants? Who would the
legitimate authority be for prosecuting the War on Terror? While the
Just War tradition lays out criteria for a preventative war, does it
justify a preemptive war?
The
answers to these questions are not only important for Christians
involved in moral discernment, but for all who are interested in a
justifiable use of force and the upholding of international law
(often largely based on this tradition). The question of
discrimination in the War on Terror is perhaps the most difficult to
answer. In a situation where the line between a terrorist enemy and a
civilian bystander is amorphous, differentiating between who is a
justifiable target and who is not becomes extremely difficult. Often
the resulting solution becomes an attack on infrastructure as a means
of compelling the noncombatant public to take steps to either turn
over the enemy or to restrict its ability to use civilians as
camouflage. This, however, leads to its own perilous effects. Citing
George Lopez's findings, Kenneth Himes points to the targeting of
infrastructure as a large cause of civilian death. In the first Gulf
War, the casualties suffered among Iraqis due to disrupted water,
sewer, and electrical services was greater than 100,000 (Himes 153).
The criteria used by the United States in target discrimination is
based on the “war sustaining” nature of the target (Himes 154).
This proves grossly vague and results in the targeting of
infrastructure that is nominally war sustaining but predominantly
life sustaining. Europeans, on the other hand, “[restrict] targets
to those that 'have an immediate effect on the enemy with whom one is
engaged'” (Himes 154). This second criteria proves much more just
than the United States' overly broad criteria yet still allows troops
to prosecute a war effectively.
The case of
legitimate authority in the War on Terror is obvious on the one hand
– Al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. therefore the U.S. is the legitimate
authority – and complex on the other – Iraq had not attacked a
nation therefore the legitimate authority for an attack on Iraq is
more difficult to discern. The details involved in this discussion
are discussed below.
The question
of prevention vis a vis preemption is possibly the central
issue of Iraq War justifications. The Just War tradition has long
held that a nation has the right to defend itself against a known
attack before it happens. This falls under prevention and comes from
the age when invasions required the amassment of large numbers of
troops and materiel on borders days or even weeks before an actual
invasion. As the technology of war allowed for more rapid deployment
of troops as well as the ability to inflict death from afar, the
rules of prevention have grown more complex.
Being scared
of an enemy is not enough to justify a preventive strike. As Himes
puts it, “suspicion or fear about another's intentions is not
adequate” for justifying war (145). But at what point does that
fear become justified? Walzer addresses this at length and uses
various historical illustrations to further his concept for
preventive attacks in the landscape of modern war. He boils the
decision to attack before being attacked down to the idea of a
“supreme emergency” (Walzer 251-268). For Walzer, the risk of
attack needs to be time sensitive. A risk that could develop over the
course of years does not justify a preventive attack. This
constitutes the “emergency” half. The risk must also be of an
overwhelming magnitude in order to justify the preventive use of
force. This makes up the “supreme” half. Walzer uses the concept
of supreme emergency to examine the civilian bombing campaign of
England in WWII as well as the Israeli Six Days War. In both cases,
Walzer believes that the initial decision to attack was justified by
a supreme emergency.1
The threat of Nazism to overrun European civilization as they knew it
was both “in the now” as well as of a grand magnitude (Walzer
255-263). For Israel, the writing was on the wall of an imminent
attack which threatened its mere existence (Walzer 82-85). If we
accept the theory of supreme emergency then the United States would
be justified in a first strike against Iraq if that nation posed a
risk of supreme emergency. This theory, as we shall see, will also
play a part in the Bush administration's argument for going to war.
Having
covered many of the theoretical bases necessary for examining the
Iraq War, it is now possible to turn to the practical side of its
justification. How was the war in Iraq “pitched” to the American
people? What attempts were made beforehand to justify the invasion?
Were the ends consistent before, during, and after the war or did the
arguments change midstream? Lastly, and perhaps most importantly,
were the arguments for going to war accurate or misinformed?
Just War Critiques of the Iraq
War
Both
leading up to the Iraq War and in its aftermath, many politicians,
ethicists, theologians, and citizens have offered justifications for
and against the United States' actions. Here I will focus mainly on
those from the Christian tradition of Just War. Many of them contain
common arguments that will help to identify mistakes made and lessons
learned. Some offer unique highlights that witness to the creative
side of the Just War tradition. All of them, however, make note of
the change in circumstances between the lead up to the invasion and
the years following the invasion.
Arguments
of American imperialism aside, no one can deny that on September
11th,
2001 the United States was attacked without provocation. And outside
of false flag conspiracy theories, the attackers were acknowledged to
be terrorists mainly of Middle Eastern background – predominantly
from Saudi Arabia. The situation gets a bit more complex when into
this description is added their years presumably spent training in
Al-Qaeda camps located in Afghanistan. America was, therefore, placed
in a defensive position, but identifying the aggressor was a bit more
problematic. Faced with the realization that Al-Qaeda was operating
out of Afghanistan without hindrance and possibly with the support of
the Taliban government, the aggressor was nominally Afghanistan. The
first criteria of the Just War tradition, that of a legitimate
authority, was answered in the affirmative for the war in Afghanistan
– the United States was the aggressed and Al-Qaeda and the Taliban
by proxy were the aggressors. Due to the amorphous nature of
terrorism, and the deft use of rhetoric by the Bush administration,
the War on Terror, however, was more than just a battle against
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
For
a conflict against Iraq as opposed to Afghanistan, there would be
additional dots that would need to be connected in order to establish
the United States as a legitimate authority to prosecute an invasion.
Before examining the two main arguments for an invasion of Iraq, it
is important to address two other arguments that were sometimes used
for the same purpose. These two were often used as secondary excuses
for the war in cases where the primary two, which will be addressed
shortly, were contested. It is important to note that Just War
tradition requires only one justifiable cause for going to war, not
four almost-good-enough causes. These two secondary arguments were:
(1) Saddam Hussein's government was corrupt and oppresive to its own
citizens to the point where a humanitarian intervention was
necessary; (2) Hussein's violation of U.N. sanctions was egregious
enough to merit punishment.
The
first of these arguments proved unjustifiable because of the lack of
recent evidence of Hussein's treachery. Even if a bad government were
assumed, the historical precedent of humanitarian intervention set
the bar much higher than the situation in Iraq merited. When
considering how many corrupt and oppressive governments were not the
target of humanitarian interventions, a decision to invade Iraq based
on humanitarian reasons would therefore belie a self-interested cause
which is anathema to the Just War tradition. The argument regarding
U.N. sanctions holds no water because the legitimate authority to
enforce the violation of U.N. sanctions would be the U.N., not a U.S.
led coalition. The authority for the use of force by the U.N. is
contained in Chapter VII of its charter where it states “[s]hould
the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.”
The two
primary arguments used for a war in Iraq needed to address the fact
that Iraq had not attacked the United States. As has been shown,
there need not be an attack in order to justify a response. Walzer's
supreme emergency establishes the criteria for preventive war. So in
order for the United States to be considered a legitimate authority
for invading Iraq, it would have to be shown that Iraq presented a
risk to the United States that was both in the “now” temporally
and in the “catastrophic” in magnitude. In order to meet this
criteria, there were two main arguments that were used to justify an
invasion of Iraq: (1) the presence of considerable stores of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) along with the ability to continue
producing and using them, (2) there were ties linking the government
of Saddam Hussein to Al-Qaeda.
The
ad bellum justification,
then, for the Iraq War rests on these two arguments. Brian Stiltner
addresses both arguments in a piece entitled “Just War: Second
Thoughts on Iraq.” Stiltner highlights the change in circumstances
mentioned above with his choice of “second thoughts” in his
title. When addressing arguments before the invasion, he states that
“war seemed justifiable because of the intelligence reports
concerning Iraq's weapons programs and because Saddam Hussein . . .
was likely to be highly dangerous if he acquired weapons of mass
destruction” (Stiltner 34). Stiltner echoes the thoughts of many of
the other authors surveyed – the WMD argument and the Al-Qaeda
argument together met the criteria for a just war. He goes on to hint
at an argument for supreme emergency when he states that these
arguments “persuaded many people that Iraq posed an imminent
threat” (Stiltner 34). The emergency criteria is covered by the
threat's being imminent and the supreme criteria is met by the
magnitude of damage a biological or chemical attack could do. Yet
these arguments faded slowly al niente
as Stiltner addresses when he states that “the just cause of
addressing weapons of mass destruction collapsed after investigations
by the press and by governmental and independent commissions revealed
deep flaws in the intelligence” (34).
Knowing
then what we know now about claims of WMD, that argument would not
have been justifiable in the use of force against Iraq. A connection
between Al-Qaeda and Iraq could still be used, however. While
diminishing the “supreme” nature of supreme emergency, Al-Qaeda
could still inflict mass casualties against the United States even
without WMD if they could count Saddam Hussein as an ally. In his
critique, Andrew Calabrese notes that in early 2003, “Secretary of
State Colin Powell appeared before the U.N. Security Council and
presented what he characterized as compelling evidence of the
existence of WMDs in Iraq and of links between Al-Qaeda and Saddam
Hussein's government” (155). Through the provenance of this
statement, it was later discovered that this assertion was attributed
to an MI6 report, but that MI6 had not made this statement. MI6 went
so far as to “[leak] its own report on the same date as Powell's
speech, denying that there had been any evidence linking Iraq and
Al-Qaeda” (Calabrese 156). Calabrese also goes on to point out that
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also “discredits
claims made by the Bush administration that there was valid evidence
of an Iraq-Al-Qaeda connection” (157). It is important to note that
Calabrese believes that the evidence for both the WMD and the terror
connection claims were shoddy from the beginning. He attempts to
prove that this is not a case of hindsight being 20/20: “during
this period [the lead up to the war], such claims were disputed, and
the evidence used to support them was discredited before, during, and
since the U.S. invasion of Iraq” (Calabrese 156). If the two
arguments used to justify the invasion of Iraq proved to be false,
then it can only be stated that the Iraq War does not meet the
criteria for a just war.2
The
arguments I have made so far concerning the war in Iraq have all been
of the ad bellum
variety. An obvious example of an in bello atrocity
would be the Abu Ghraib scandal. There is simply no argument to be
made for what occurred there. I will address a possible cause for
similar atrocities below. Other in bello arguments
concern the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to inflict damage from
afar with weapons such as cruise missiles, “smart bombs,” and
drone aircraft. Many of these arguments will have to be developed
further based on case studies from Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe
that at the heart of these new techniques is the importance of aim.
Accurate aim means a combatant is more likely to be hit and a
noncombatant less likely to be hit. Aim also has target assignment as
a prerequisite. Assigning proper targets also address the issue of
noncombatant immunity. I will address these topics later when dealing
with military training.
It is not
the goal of this paper to assign blame for the evidence used to
justify an invasion that ended up being proved false. The arguments
have been made that the Bush administration knowingly and willfully
misled the public. It has also been argued that the intelligence
given to the administration was simply flawed and no malintent was
present. Regardless of which argument proves true, there can still be
lessons learned from the Iraq War and its relation to the Just War
tradition.
It is my
belief that it was not the criteria of the Just War tradition that
caused us to enter into an unjust conflict in Iraq, but rather
institutional and systemic issues that prevented the country and its
government from arriving at the proper decision. I will focus on
three sine quibus non which contribute to the decision making
process as well as the prosecution of a just war. First among these
is the importance of training in the military – both technical and
ethical. This first prerequisite is not Iraq specific; military
ethics training is important for the Just War tradition in general,
but has gotten short shrift in many military training programs As
mentioned previously, aim is of the utmost importance and should not
be overlooked, but neither should the training of all troops in
military and combat ethics. Second among these prerequisites is the
need for a high quality press whose product is accurate. Since the
press is the main non-governmental source of data that goes into the
decision making process, a low-quality press could result in a poor
decision. Garbage in, garbage out. And lastly, the need for honest
public conversation about war must take place before the decision is
made to initiate one. This is especially true for a democracy such as
the U.S.
1Walzer
believes the contiued bombing of civilian populations, however,
ceased to be just at some point.
2The
majority of Christian critiques of the Iraq War are remarkably
consistent on this point. See Burghardt, Casey, Colson, Gorringe,
Himes, Lull, Revering, and Stiltner for similar non-justified
arguments. Strehle is the sole author arguing for a justified
intervention in Iraq.
Wednesday, September 4, 2013
The Evolving Just War Tradition (Part 1)
This is a paper I wrote several years ago that examined the Iraq War through the lens of the Just War tradition. I think many of the comparisons, as well as the basic JW framework, can apply to Syria as well. For instance, before the invasion of Iraq we were told that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that it was affiliated with Al Qaeda. Now, we are being told that Syria has used chemical weapons on civilians. Whether Just War endorses violence or not depends on this information being CORRECT. Anything short of a UN report saying Assad used chemical weapons, in my opinion, is not enough.
Here is part one of the paper. Bibliography will appear at the end of each part for reference.
Here is part one of the paper. Bibliography will appear at the end of each part for reference.
The
Evolving Just War Tradition: Lessons Learned From Iraq
The
relationship of Christianity to violence has had a long and bountiful
history – both through the fruits of academic discourse and through
the spoils and suffering of “holy war.” The tradition of
arguments for the justified use of deadly force has come to be known
as Just War Theory – although many modern theorists prefer to
replace “theory” with “tradition” to more accurately reflect
the genealogy and ongoing revision of its arguments. Since Augustine,
this tradition has passed through Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and
the Anabaptists all the way to contemporary Christian ethicists such
as Reinhold Niebuhr and John Howard Yoder.
While it
is not the goal of this paper to provide a historical or theoretical
review of the Just War tradition, it will be necessary to establish
the most common criteria used in arguing for the justified use of
force. I will then examine the Just War critiques for the 2003
invasion of Iraq (hereafter referred to as the “Iraq War”) and
see if there are any commonalities among these critiques – the vast
majority of which find the Iraq War to be unjustified. Using these
commonalities, I will attempt to offer reasons for the failure of the
tradition to prevent this war. These reasons can be used in an
attempt to better critique any future conflicts that may arise. While
the Just War tradition may not ever result in a lasting global peace,
I believe the goal of making each successive war more just than the
last would go a long way towards reducing the amount of suffering
inherent in war.
Criteria
Justifying the Use of Force
The
criteria that the Just War tradition addresses most commonly fall
into two separate categories: jus ad bellum
which establishes what just causes for war might be (pre-war
criteria) and jus in bello
which provide criteria for justly prosecuting a war (in-war
criteria). Yoder has assembled a 13 page list of all the various
criteria historically mentioned as necessary for a just war. The goal
of this list is to show the magnitude and evolution of the tradition
(Yoder 147-161). While this appendix is insightful, a more concise
framework for justifiable violence is outlined by A. James Reimer in
Christians and War.
This framework is also found in the vast majority of Just War
thinkers in some way or another. Reimer boils down jus ad
bellum criteria to:
(1) legitimate authority declaring and waging war; (2) just cause;
(3) peace as the ultimate intention or goal; (4) love of neighbor.
not hatred or vengefulness, as the motivation; (5) war as last
resort – all other avenues must have been exhausted before going to
war; and (6) probability of success. (73)
To
these six criteria are added four more that cover jus in
bello:
(7) means as commensurate with the intended end; (8) proportionality
of means to end – the harm caused must not exceed the harm
prevented; (9) immunity of innocent people – the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants; and (10) respect for
international law. (Reimer 73-4)
Reimer's ten criteria provide a broad yet manageable foundation for
understanding the framework within which the Christian tradition
views the justification of violence. To this religious framework,
Michael Walzer adds a secular utilitarian view. While Walzer agrees
with all of the criteria outlined above, he also relies on the
“domestic analogy” and number crunching as the basis for many of
his criteria. For Walzer, “every comparison of home and country or
of personal property and political independence” relies on this
analogy (58). In this view, just war is like killing an intruder and
aggressive invasion is like breaking and entering. Where he admits
this analogy fails, however, is that there are no police to call on
when one country is charged with breaking and entering. Because of
this, Walzer argues that “police powers are distributed among all
the members [of international society]” (59). From this, Walzer
lays out criteria for determining the aggressor in a conflict
(similar to Reimer's six pre-war criteria) and calls for a response.
A unilateral response is only just when the sole reacting party is
the one being attacked. In many modern cases, the attacked is for all
practical reasons defenseless. In these cases, Walzer argues that a
multilateral response is the only just response. Third parties acting
unilaterally will most often betray some level of self-interest
(here, Walzer's secular philosophy matches very nicely with Reinhold
Niebuhr's Christian realism). While this self-interest may also be
the case in multilateral actions, its dilution is a lesser of two
evils (Walzer xiv).
Before
advancing to the intricacies of the justification for the Iraq War,
it should be pointed out that pacifism is also a strong Christian
tradition regarding violence. Some Christian pacifists take their
inspiration from the Decalog, but most focus on the Sermon on the
Mount. The Society of Friends (the Quakers) are probably the most
well known pacifists while other Anabaptists, such as the Mennonites,
also represent the peace movement. Both Yoder and Reimer are
Mennonite pacifists. Interestingly enough, both have written books on
Just War. Yoder's When War Is Unjust
is an excellent accompaniment to Walzer. While often agreeing with
Walzer, Yoder raises two important points that deserve mention.
First, the Just War ethic must
at times serve the negative function of denouncing a war or possible
war as unjust. Yoder seems to be aiming mainly at government
officials and Christian spokespeople who run in those powerful
circles. The calls for jus in bello
during World War II from Christian ethicists as well as the
denouncement of the Vietnam War by similar voices point to an
overgeneralization by Yoder. There have been Christian denouncements
of unjust wars and unjust means, but they are often unsuccessful. Yet
Yoder is correct in accenting the negative quality of the tradition –
some wars are simply not just.
The second point that Yoder makes is the necessity for selective
conscientious objection. Pacifism teaches that all wars are immoral.
This makes it easy for a pacifist to claim conscientious objection.
An individual who subscribes to the Just War tradition, however, will
refuse to fight only in unjust wars. Yet this action could land that
individual in jail. As Yoder states:
The fact that a Quaker or Amish young man, rejecting all wars as his
church teaches, could be recognized as a conscientious objector and
given alternative service, whereas a Catholic or Lutheran draftee,
evaluating wars case by case as his church teaches, could not,
represents a kind of backhanded establishment of religion. (49)
Yoder is right, I believe, in hinting at the unconstitutionality of
the lack of selective conscientious objection. If one's religion
teaches them to practice moral discernment as outlined in the Just
War tradition, prohibiting that person from practicing this aspect of
their faith could not only be seen as a “backhanded establishment
of religion” but also as a violation of one's freedom of religion.1
While the pacifist tradition is strong in this country, I believe
that both Yoder's and Reimer's decision to address Just War tradition
acknowledges the pragmatic necessity of accepting that we will not
see “peace in our time” but must rather work on restraining war.
It is here that I believe the majority of American Christians would
agree with Reinhold Niebuhr who, when writing in April 1941 about the
precarious state of Europe, says “the only peace that Hitler would
accept now would be one that left an unredeemed continent under the
heel of his dictatorship and that would give him the possibility of a
more complete triumph later” (172). For Niebuhr and many
Christians, an unjust peace is not preferable to a just war.
PART 2 FOUND HERE.
PART 2 FOUND HERE.
1The
case for selective conscientious objection is most valid regarding
conscription, but possibly could also be applicable to enlistment.
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